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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS L. HARRISON,

No. C 07-3824 SI (pr)

Plaintiff,

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT**

v.

INSTITUTIONAL GANG OF
INVESTIGATIONS; et al.,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Marcus L. Harrison, a California prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting a First Amendment claim regarding the confiscation of some of his outgoing and incoming mail. Defendants moved for summary judgment and plaintiff opposed the motion. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Harrison alleged in his complaint that Pelican Bay officials violated his First Amendment rights by misapplying the prison regulations and confiscating incoming and outgoing mail pertaining to, among other things, the Black August memorial, the New Afrikan Collective Think Tank, the George Jackson University and the New Afrikan Institute of Criminology 101. Complaint, p. 6. Defendants do not deny that Harrison's outgoing mail was confiscated, but contend that the confiscation was permissible because the materials confiscated pertained to

1 events and organizations affiliated with the Black Guerilla Family, a prison gang of which
2 Harrison is a member. Harrison denies that the materials are gang-related and urges that the
3 entities and organizations discussed exist "to promote educational, social, cultural, [and] political
4 awareness from the viewpoints of the New Afrikan." Complaint, p. 8.

5 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

6 Harrison has been validated as a member of the Black Guerilla Family prison gang
7 ("BGF"). As a result of his validation, he is housed in the security housing unit at Pelican Bay
8 indefinitely.

9 Defendant Devan Hawkes is a correctional counselor II, specialist at Pelican Bay. He
10 investigates gang activity, develops and implements gang management strategies, and answers
11 appeals filed by inmates. He also assists in the classification of gang affiliates for housing and
12 programming at the prison. Defendant G. Stewart is a correctional counselor I in the SHU at
13 Pelican Bay. Both defendants are part of Pelican Bay's institutional gang investigations unit.

14
15 A. The BGF Prison Gang

16 The "primary goal of prison gangs, which are highly organized entities that have a clear
17 power structure, is to undermine the safety of individuals inside and outside of the prison."
18 Hawkes Decl., ¶ 6. As a result of intelligence gathered over the years, prison officials have
19 obtained information about the BGF and certain other entities. Hawkes stated the following
20 about BGF: "The BGF is a prison gang that arose out of a 1960's movement co-founded by
21 George Jackson. At the time that the gang was established, one of its stated goals was the
22 overthrow of the United States government. The gang established the 'Black August' observance
23 to honor deceased members of both the Black Movement and the BGF. Black August is
24 observed by both present and former BGF members and is promoted by BGF affiliates (ex-
25 felons) residing in the community. During Black August, members of the BGF advocate
26 retaliation against correctional officers and others for the deaths of BGF 'comrades' who have
27 allegedly been murdered by prison officials." Hawkes Decl., ¶ 7. Black August has 31 days of
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1 fasting with days of particular importance for deceased Black Movement and BGF members,
2 several of whom were prisoners allegedly killed by correctional staff.

3 The prison's gang investigations unit has, through interviews with inmates and
4 confiscation of materials, learned about connections between the BGF and other entities.

5 [The unit] has learned that the gang is attempting to use other groups and entities as
6 "cover" to lend respectability to the BGF, and facilitate communication between BGF
7 affiliates. For example, former BGF members have reported that the New Afrikan
8 Revolutionary Nationalist, New Afrikan Collective Think Tank, the George Jackson
University, and the New Afrikan Institute of Criminology 101 are entities that promote
the BGF. References to those entities have been found in both the cells of BGF members
and among the community contacts that are associated with BGF members.

9 Hawkes Decl., ¶ 9.

10 Hawkes also described information his gang investigations unit had learned about the
11 dragon's symbolism for the BGF.

12 The testimony of former BGF members indicates that the dragon is a symbol of the BGF.
13 That testimony is supported by documents discovered in the cells of BGF members and
14 associates. For example, BGF members refer to Jeffrey Gauden as 'Joka Khatari.' The
15 term 'Joka' means 'dragon' in Swahili. Furthermore, a BGF cadre reserved for the upper
ranks of the gang is called the 'Joka' or 'Dragon' cadre, and images of a dragon wrapped
around a tower are among several tattoos and emblems recognized by the BGF.

16 Id. at ¶ 10.

17 Based on materials obtained from BGF members by prison officials, defendants believe
18 that the BGF is committed to an armed revolutionary struggle against the California Department
19 of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Defendants point out that in one document, a BGF member
20 described himself as an "extremist," called for "extreme measures to solve extreme problems,"
21 and urged that "by no stretch of the imagination can we hope to overthrow so determined an
22 enemy without force." Motion, p. 4, citing Complaint, Ex. B. However, this was not a
23 document in Harrison's mail, but rather was a document obtained in 1992 that was among the
24 materials that prison officials had seen that led them to their conclusions about BGF's danger.

25
26 B. Regulations Related to Prison Gangs and Inmate Mail

27 The California Code of Regulations defines a "prison gang" as any gang with its roots or
28 origins within the CDCR or any other prison system. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3000. A primary

1 goal of prison gangs is to undermine the safety of individuals inside and outside of the prison.
2 Decl. D. Hawkes ¶ 6. "Inmates and parolees shall not knowingly promote, further or assist any
3 gang as defined under section 3000." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3023(a). An inmate qualifies for an
4 indeterminate term in a SHU if he is a validated member or associate of a prison gang. Decl. D.
5 Hawkes ¶ 6.

6 The regulations prohibit mailing gang-related materials and other contraband. 15 Cal.
7 Code Regs. §§ 3006, 3136. Any material reasonably deemed to be a threat to a legitimate
8 penological interest is classified as contraband. Id. at §3006(c)(16). The regulations direct
9 prison staff not to permit an inmate to send or receive mail which, in their judgment, has any
10 characteristics listed in section 3006(c). Id. at § 3136(a).

11
12 C. Harrison's Confiscated Mail and Administrative Appeals

13 Several items were seized by prison officials from Harrison's outgoing mail: (1) three
14 manila envelopes containing five type-written pages pertaining to Black August addressed to
15 Kathleen Cleaver, Prison & Parole Studies Project and Friends of Marilyn Buck; (2) two letters
16 regarding Black August addressed to Black Brigade and Voices in Black Newsletter; (3) a letter
17 promoting the New Afrikan Revolutionary Nationalism, the New Afrikan Collective Think
18 Tank, and the New Afrikan Institute of Criminology addressed to Coalition Against Police
19 Abuse and (4) one manila envelope containing a drawing of a dragon addressed to "My Favorite
20 Lil Sista C/O Hannah Bastienne." Compl., Exs. A-D.

21 Prison officials also intercepted some incoming mail to Harrison, apparently including
22 an envelope containing pictures of George Jackson, Joanne Chesimard (also known as Assata
23 Shakur), Malcolm X, Nat Turner, and others, which Harrison had previously sent out for
24 copying. Compl., Ex F. The exhibit indicates that the mail eventually was delivered to Harrison
25 after he filed an inmate appeal. Id. It is unclear from the exhibit whether there was other mail
26 that was not delivered to Harrison.

27 After intercepting Harrison's mail, prison officials issued a "notification of disapproval -
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1 mail/packages/publications" that explained why the materials were being withheld. See, e.g.,
2 Compl., Ex. B. A "gang information chrono" was also issued which stated that Pelican Bay's
3 institutional gang investigations unit had reviewed the relevant mail, and that the promotion of
4 Black August, the New Afrikan Collective Think Tank, the George Jackson University and the
5 New Afrikan Institute of Criminology 101 in those materials demonstrated Harrison's active
6 affiliation with the BGF prison gang. Id.

7 8 **VENUE AND JURISDICTION**

9 Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions
10 giving rise to the claims occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison in Del Norte County, which is
11 located within the Northern District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). This court has federal
12 question jurisdiction over this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

13 14 **LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

15 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that
16 there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to
17 judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court will grant summary judgment
18 "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
19 essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . .
20 since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
21 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
22 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and
23 a dispute about such a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
24 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
25 248 (1986).

26 Generally, when a party challenges the merits of the opponent's claim, the moving party
27 bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence
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1 of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond
2 the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
3 admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
4 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).

5 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it
6 is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Schroeder
7 v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's verified
8 complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28
9 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and
10 allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). The complaint
11 was made under penalty of perjury and therefore is considered as evidence.

12 The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility
13 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W.
14 Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence
15 must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn
16 from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 631.

17
18 **DISCUSSION**

19 "[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
20 privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."
21 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
22 Prisoners retain those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or
23 with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Id. In evaluating a mail
24 confiscation claim, the court applies two slightly different tests – the test used for restrictions
25 on outgoing mail is slightly more difficult for prison officials than the test used for restrictions
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1 on incoming mail.¹

2 A limitation on *outgoing* mail is justified only if the limitation in question (1) "furthers
3 an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," and (2) is "no
4 greater than necessary or essential" to protect the governmental interest involved. Procunier v.
5 Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
6 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989); Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).

7 As to *incoming* mail, a regulation or practice limiting prisoners' receipt of mail is valid
8 if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413 (citing
9 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.
10 1999). Four factors are to be considered when determining the reasonableness of a prison rule:
11 (1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
12 governmental interest put forward to justify it," (2) "whether there are alternative means of
13 exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates," (3) "the impact accommodation of the
14 asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of
15 prison resources generally," and (4) the "absence of ready alternatives", or, in other words,
16 whether the rule at issue is an "exaggerated response to prison concerns." Turner, 482 U.S. at
17 89-90.

18 Prison officials are not required to show with certainty that any particular correspondence
19 would have adverse consequences because they are given some latitude in anticipating the
20 probable consequences of allowing a certain speech in and out of a prison environment.
21 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 414; see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)
22 (courts owe "substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators.")

23 This court's ability to evaluate the merits of this case is hampered by the fact that neither
24 party has put in the record the particular documents that were confiscated – if those documents
25 still exist. Plaintiff submitted some documents that may or may not be the confiscated
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27 ¹Defendants contend that the regulations pertaining to the confiscation of the mail were
28 proper. Plaintiff does not challenge the regulations, however, so there is no need for the court
to evaluate the regulations in this action. See Opposition, pp. 3-4.

1 documents, see Complaint, Ex. A, but largely the court must rely on the parties' descriptions of
2 the documents to do its analysis.

3
4 A. Outgoing Mail

5 Confiscation of outgoing mail must further an important or substantial governmental
6 interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413; see,
7 e.g., id. (refusal to send letters concerning escape plans or proposed criminal activity would be
8 an obvious example of justifiable censorship).² Prison officials may not censor inmate
9 correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate
10 statements. Id. Procunier v. Martinez upheld the lower court's decision that invalidated several
11 regulations regarding outgoing mail, specifically, regulations that allowed "censorship of
12 statements that 'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances,' *expression of 'inflammatory political,*
13 *racial, religious or other views,*' and matter deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate.'"
14 416 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). The Court determined that the prison officials "failed to
15 show that these broad restrictions on prisoner mail were in any way necessary to the furtherance
16 of a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id. With respect to the
17 regulation allowing censorship of the expression of inflammatory views, the Court rejected
18 prison officials' contention that such "'matter clearly presents a danger to prison security.' . . .
19 The regulation, however, is not narrowly drawn to reach only material that might be thought to
20 encourage violence nor is its application limited to incoming letters." Id. at 416. Once the
21 government interest allegedly being protected by the limitation on outgoing mail is identified,
22 then one must consider whether the limitation is no greater than necessary to protect that interest.
23 A tighter fit between governmental interest and the limitation imposed is required for outgoing
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26 ²The Supreme Court listed with approval certain kinds of outgoing mail that reasonably
27 might be disallowed: (1) that which might violate postal regulations, e.g., threats, blackmail, or
28 contraband; (2) that which indicates a plot to escape; (3) that which discusses criminal activities;
that which indicates that the inmate is running a business while he is in confinement; or (5)
that which contains codes or other obvious attempts to circumvent legitimate prison regulations.
416 U.S. at 414 n.14.

1 mail than incoming mail because outgoing mail generally has less serious implications on prison
2 security than incoming mail due to the fact that, by its nature, outgoing mail typically does not
3 pose a serious threat to internal prison order and security. See Thornburg v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
4 401, 411-13 (1989).

5 Defendants have the burden to prove that the confiscation furthered an important
6 government interest and to prove that the confiscation of materials was no greater than necessary
7 to protect that interest. Cf. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530-34 (2006) (putting burden on the
8 state to show penological interest, and connection between the limitation and the penological
9 objective when Turner, 482 U.S. 78, applies); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 874 (9th Cir.
10 2001) ("To satisfy Turner, the Board must, at the very least, adduce some penological reason for
11 its policy at the relevant stage of the judicial proceedings.")

12 Defendants contend that they confiscated the outgoing mail at issue because it posed a
13 threat to the interests of preserving security and order at the prison. The threat is based on the
14 connection between the BGF prison gang and the subject matter of the pieces of mail.
15 Defendants presented evidence that Black August is observed and promoted by BGF, and is a
16 time during which BGF members advocate retaliation against correctional officers and others.
17 Defendants presented evidence that the New Afrikan Revolutionary Nationalist, the New
18 Afrikan Collective Think Tank, the George Jackson University and the New Afrikan Institute
19 of Criminology promote the BGF. Defendants presented evidence that the dragon is a symbol
20 of the BGF. See Decl. D. Hawkes ¶¶ 7-10.

21 Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show that the confiscation of Harrison's
22 outgoing mail was no greater than necessary to protect the asserted interest of prison security and
23 safety. Defendants do not contend that the intended recipients were in the BGF, or that the
24 confiscated mail contained any coded message, or that the confiscated mail actually advocated
25 violence. Defendants urge the mail was properly confiscated because it promoted BGF's "armed
26 revolutionary struggle" against the CDCR. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 9:21-22. Defendants take a
27 very expansive view of what might "promote" a prison gang's illicit activities and apply it with
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1 gusto, while the First Amendment requires a more nuanced approach.³

2 Defendants appear to contend that a categorical ban on things related to Black August is
3 proper, as they have not identified any particular statement about Black August in Harrison's
4 mail that actually "might be thought to encourage violence." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
5 at 416. Black August commemorates some people who prison officials may not think are worthy
6 of commemorating, but the defendants have not made an adequate showing of such a close
7 connection between the BGF and Black August that the court could find it undisputed that mail
8 pertaining to Black August actually presented a danger to prison security or actually encouraged
9 violence. The parties disagree whether Black August was started by the BGF, and even
10 defendants state that Black August honors deceased members of "both the Black Movement and
11 the BGF." Hawkes Decl., ¶ 7.

12 Defendants' showing is even less convincing with regard to the confiscation of materials
13 pertaining to the New Afrikan Collective Think Thank, the New Afrikan Institute of
14 Criminology 101, and the George Jackson University. Harrison presents evidence that "the
15 central focus & objective of the Black August memorial, the New Afrikan Collective Think
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17 ³A review of published circuit cases both upholding and rejecting censorship indicates
18 that the courts closely examine the fit between asserted penological interest and the particular
19 outgoing mail being censored, rather than accept at face-value an assertion by prison officials
20 that the confiscation serves security or rehabilitation interests. Cases upholding censorship of
21 outgoing mail include Morgan v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2009) (penological
22 interest in rehabilitation justified disciplining inmate for sending vulgar note to opposing
23 counsel, so it was not an impermissible infringement of his First Amendment rights); Koutnik
24 v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2006) (no First Amendment violation; confiscation of
25 prisoner's mail to merchandising company urging it to add communist-themed posters to its
26 product line and enclosing drawing of swastika with cell bars that had anti-corrections
27 department slogan on ground that it had a gang symbol (i.e., the swastika) furthered important
28 interest in rehabilitation); Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 375-76 (3d Cir. 2003) (ban on
outgoing mail to former prisoners did not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights); and
Leonard v. Nix, 55 F.3d 370, 374-76 (8th Cir. 1995) (no First Amendment violation in
disciplinary action taken against prisoner for writing scurrilous comments about warden in letter
to former inmate but intended to be read by prison staff). Cases finding constitutional violation
in censorship of outgoing mail include Loggins v. Delo, 999 F.2d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 1993)
(discipline imposed for outgoing mail that had offensive comments about mailroom clerk
violated prisoner's First Amendment rights because the offensive language did not implicate
prison security concerns); and McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusal
to mail prisoner's letter in which he wrote to his girlfriend that prison officer had sex with a cat;
court recognized that the statements were coarse and offensive but rejected prison guard's
argument that allowing such mail would lead to a "total breakdown" in prison security).

1 Thank (N.A.C.T.T.), the New Afrikan Institute of Criminology 101 (N.A.I.C.) etc. is to promote
2 educational social, cultural, & political awareness from the viewpoints of the new Afrikan."
3 Complaint, p. 8. Defendants respond that, even if that is true, "it is a 'social, political and
4 cultural' movement that promotes the BGF" and they therefore were justified in withholding
5 Harrison's mail concerning those groups. Reply, p. 2. Defendants think that BGF uses
6 organizations such as these "as 'cover' to lend respectability to the BGF, and facilitate
7 communication between BGF affiliates," Hawkes Decl., ¶ 9, but they do not identify any of
8 these entities as having the anti-prison authority outlook that Black August does, let alone that
9 any of these entities advocate violence against prison officials. Most importantly, defendants
10 do not identify any particular statement in these mailings that actually might be thought to
11 encourage violence. In light of Harrison's plausible statements that these groups promote social,
12 cultural and political awareness from a "New Afrikan" perspective, plus defendants' statement
13 that they are used as cover to give the gang respectability, plus the absence of a showing of the
14 particular evils of any of these groups, there is a concern of the possibility that defendants may
15 have taken a race-based shortcut and assumed anything having to do with African-American
16 culture could be banned under the guise of controlling the BGF. Cf. Richardson v. Runnels, No.
17 07-16736, slip op. 1433, 1442-44 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2010).

18 Defendants' showing is least convincing with regard to their confiscation of the outgoing
19 mail that had a drawing of a dragon on it. The court defers to prison officials' professional
20 judgment that it was a BGF gang-related symbol, even though Harrison claims it was not a BGF
21 symbol. See Koutnik, 456 F.3d at 785 (deferring to prison officials' determination that a
22 drawing of swastika was a gang-related symbol). Doing so does not resolve the matter because
23 defendants have not identified how the drawing itself might be thought to encourage violence.
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25 It is not in doubt that prison gangs present a danger to prison safety and security, and that
26 limiting the activities of these gangs serves an important governmental interest. While prison
27 officials may well be able to ban possession of the materials within the prison, the particular
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1 challenge here is to the censorship of the mail as it left the prison, at which point the interests
2 of the recipients become a consideration. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 407-09. Even
3 giving substantial deference to prison officials' professional judgment, the court cannot
4 conclude, as a matter of law, that there was a sufficiently tight fit between the security interest
5 and confiscation of these particular pieces of mail to make the confiscation constitutionally
6 permissible. The motion must be denied with respect to the outgoing mail.

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8 B. Incoming Mail

9 Defendants do not argue that they were entitled to summary judgment with regard to the
10 confiscation of the incoming mail. In fact, they state that it is "unclear what, if any, incoming
11 mail was withheld by prison officials." Motion, p. 5. The confiscation of incoming mail was
12 alleged in the complaint, and Harrison filed an inmate appeal regarding it, see Complaint, Ex.
13 F, but the facts related to any confiscation of incoming mail are not at all clear. Since the record
14 is sufficiently undeveloped as to what happened, and defendants failed to present any argument
15 that they were entitled to summary judgment on this claim by Harrison, the motion is denied
16 with respect to the incoming mail.

17
18 C. Qualified Immunity

19 The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for
20 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
21 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
22 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth
23 a two-pronged test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. The court must consider this
24 threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
25 facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If no
26 constitutional right was violated if the facts were as alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants
27 prevail. See id. If, however, "a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties'
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1 submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . .
2 "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
3 that what he is doing violates that right.' . . . The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining
4 whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
5 conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v.
6 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Although Saucier required courts to address the questions
7 in the particular sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to decide which prong
8 to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. See Pearson v. Callahan,
9 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).

10 Here, Procunier v. Martinez provides the relevant clearly established law on a prisoner's
11 First Amendment rights vis-a-vis outgoing mail. It was clearly established that the confiscation
12 of Harrison's outgoing mail would have been justified only if it (1) "further[ed] an important
13 governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," and (2) was "no greater than
14 necessary or essential" to protect the governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416
15 U.S. at 413. Taken in the light most favorable to Harrison, the facts alleged would allow a
16 reasonable jury to find a violation of his First Amendment right to send mail, as discussed in the
17 section above rejecting defendants' argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
18 law on the merits of Harrison's claim.

19 Defendants urge that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, even if their conduct
20 was found to be unconstitutional, it would not have been clear to a reasonable prison officer that
21 such conduct was unlawful because they were acting in accord with the California Code of
22 Regulations. However, the state regulations do not establish the existence or scope of the federal
23 constitutional right and existing case law would suggest that compliance with state regulations
24 – such as the broad ones here which allowed confiscation of any outgoing mail that had anything
25 deemed contraband within the prison – would not shield a prison official from liability for
26 constitutional violations. See generally Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)
27 (CDCR operations manual describing duties that, if performed, would have avoided the alleged
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1 wrong to plaintiff, were irrelevant to qualified immunity inquiry because they did not establish
2 a federal constitutional right); California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039,
3 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying qualified immunity to defendants who interrogated suspects
4 in violation of Miranda, notwithstanding training material permitting such interrogations and
5 Supreme Court opinions allowing the use of such interrogations for impeachment). Defendants
6 are not entitled to judgment in their favor on the qualified immunity defense.

7
8 **CONCLUSION**

9 For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
10 (Docket # 38.) No later than **April 2, 2010**, the parties must file and serve case management
11 reports indicating what discovery remains to be done, the amount of time needed for discovery,
12 whether any further motions will be filed, when they will be ready for trial, and the expected
13 length of the trial. The statements need not be jointly prepared.

14 Defendants must file and serve an answer to the complaint no later than **April 2, 2010**.
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2).

16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 Dated: February 22, 2010

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20 SUSAN ILLSTON
21 United States District Judge
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